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Candrakiirti's Denial of the Self
By James Duerlinger


A difficulty faced by any philosophical system which makes the denial of self one of its cornerstones is to explain how this denial can be intelligible, since it seems to presuppose the existence of the self whose existence is being denied. In this paper I shall explain how Candrakiirti, a Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika Buddhist who flourished in India sometime between the end of the sixth century A. D. and the beginning of the seventh, deals with this problem in the very process of presenting his proof that there is no self. The proof occurs in the Introduction to the Middle Way, (1) a work he seems to have composed as a supplement to Naagaarjuna's famous Treatise on the Middle Way, which was probably composed. In the second century A.D. Candrakiirti's proof, I hope to make clear, is not unintelligible, since it involves at least two different conceptions of self, one whose existence is being denied and another whose existence is presupposed by the denial of the existence of the first. To avoid confusion, the self whose existence Candrakiirti means to deny I shall henceforth call the Self, while the self whose existence he thinks is presupposed by this denial I shall call either the self or the person. (2) Candrakiirti, in other words, avoids the problem of the intelligibility of the denial of self by distinguishing the Self to be denied from the self or person who denies it. There is no contradiction or paradox in the denial that the self is not a Self.

Maadhyamikas are Buddhist philosophers who claim that the ultimate reality(3) of any phenomenon(4) is its absence of ultimate or real existence, that is, existence it possesses by itself.(5) This school of philosophers was founded by Naagaarjuna, who denied the independent or separate existence of all phenomena, including self, in order to forge a true middle way(6) between the extremes of asserting their ultimate or real existence and denying their conventional or nominal existence, (7) that is, existence they do not possess by themselves but in dependence on conventions or on the names assigned to phenomena on the basis of conventions.

Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamikas are Buddhist philosophers who establish this middle way in the minds of their opponents solely by drawing consequences (8) from their opponents' views in accord with criteria of validity and soundness accepted by their opponents as existent by their own natures.(9) They are contrasted in this respect to the Svaatantrika-Maadhyamikas, who believe that this middle way may also be established in the minds of opponents by the use of inferences which are independent(10) in the sense that their validity and soundness can be established in the minds of both themselves and their opponents by reference to criteria which can be found by both parties to exist by their own natures, even though these criteria only conventionally exist. The Praasa^ngikas deny that the validity and soundness of inferences can be established in this way because they claim chat nothing can exist by its own nature if all phenomena only conventionally or nominally exist. What exists by its own nature, they claim, must exist by itself.

Candrakiirti's Introduction to the Middle Way is a supplement to Naagaarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way in the sense of giving topics only briefly discussed in it a more extensive treatment from the Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika point of view. It is composed for the most part of verses which explain the ten stages of spiritual discipline through which the aspirant to Buddhahood must pass to achieve his goal. Candrakiirti explains the dominant practices in each stage and what must be achieved in each in order to enter into the next. In the sixth stage, the practice of wisdom is dominant, and as part of his explanation of its practice Candrakiirti presents arguments which can be used by meditators to help them cognize the ultimate reality of phenomena in general and persons in particular. His full discussion of the means by which the ultimate reality of persons can be cognized encompasses verses 120-178. Only in verses 110-150, however, does he present the actual argument itself. Verses 151-178 he seems to have composed primarily to clarify this argument, and especially to check the tendency of the reader to conclude from the argument that there is no conventionally existent self, a nihilistic result which conflicts with the doctrine of ultimate reality he espouses. I shall directly discuss only verses 120-150, but the import of verses 151-178 for the interpretation of verses 120-150 will be integrated into my discussion.

The overall purpose of Candrakiirti's discussion is to show the meditator how to arrive at an inferential understanding of the ultimate reality of the self without falling into the extremes of understanding it to have real existence or of believing it to lack even nominal existence. The ultimate reality of a person, he believes, is the person's emptiness or absence of independent existence.(11) This simply means that a person does not exist by himself or by his own nature, apart from everything else.

According to the non-Praasa^ngika philosophical schools of Indian Buddhism by contrast, the ultimate reality of the person is his absence of being independently existent in the limited sense of being an entity which exists apart from the mind-body aggregates.(12) Candrakiirti claims that this is not the ultimate reality of the person which we must perceive in order to achieve liberation. Since the misconception of ourselves as not dependently existent in this limited way is not the inborn misconception which contaminates our actions and thereby perpetuates our rebirth in the worlds of suffering. He argues that when the person is exhaustively analyzed to find a Self, something independently existent in the full sense, it cannot be found. Even so, he believes that the person does conventionally exist in the sense that he is distinguished from other things according to the nonanalytical. Conventional elaboration of the things that are, and that he is the self which denies the existence of the Self. This is a self which is projected by thought into the mind-body aggregates when they are perceived, and it only nominally exists in the sense that it is an imputation of thought to which a name is assigned on the basis of convention.

This self, however, appears to our nonanalytical, convention-bound consciousness, which cannot discern its ultimate reality, as separately existent, and on the basis of our beginningless acquaintance with this appearance we have an inborn belief that the self exists the way it appears to exist. Because the person appears to exist in this way to our obscured minds, he is called a conventional reality.(13) His ultimate reality directly appears only to an unobscured ultimate consciousness which becomes manifest after extensive practice of meditation. This consciousness is ultimate not in the sense that it ultimately exists, but in the sense that it is a conventionally existent nondual perception of ultimate reality.

The aim of the reasoning which establishes the ultimate reality of the self is to destroy, in conjunction with a highly developed power of concentration, (14) our innate belief in the independent existence of the person, who is a conventional reality, rather than our belief in the conventional existence of this reality, since it is this belief which perpetuates our rebirth. The appearance of the conventionally existent self as independently existent is not destroyed by this means, for whenever we perceive the mind-body aggregates, the idea of a self or person arises, and when it arises it must appear to us to exist by itself. Since it is only our deep-seated belief that this self exists independently that causes us to take rebirth, there is no need to destroy this appearance of independent existence in order to escape rebirth. The conventionally real self that has directly perceived its own ultimate reality will thus continue to appear to itself as independently existent when it is not perceiving its own ultimate reality but it will no longer assent to this appearance.



Candrakiirti introduces the reasoning by which the ultimate reality of the person is revealed with a statement of its purpose: Verse 120, Having realized that all mental afflictions and suffering without exception arise from the belief in Self (15) and having realized the object of this belief to be a Self the yogi undertakes a refutation of [the existence of] a Self.

The belief in self is our inborn belief that we are independently existent persons. The real object of this belief is the dependently arising self or person who is falsely believed to exist independently, and the Self whose existence is to be refuted is the apparent object of the belief, an independently existent self.

Among the three most basic kinds of afflictions of the mind, which are attachment, anger, and delusion, the most basic is delusion, and the most fundamental delusion is the belief in self, because all other afflictions and sufferings arise from it. Thought projects a self image or idea onto the mindbody aggregates when they are perceived, and because the projected selfappears to exist by itself rather than as a mere projection, the delusion occurs that it independently exists, that is to say, that it is a Self. The Buddhist meditator or yogin, therefore, wishes to destroy this delusion, and to arrive at this goal he sets out to prove that there is no Self. The refutation of the independent existence of the self or person is called the proof of the Selflessness of the person.(16) Candrakiirti's proof of the Selflessness of the person is an elaborate version of an argument presented by Naagaarjuna in the first verse of chapter eighteen of the Treatise. The argument is that if the person independently exists, he would be either really different from or really the same as his mind-body aggregates, but since he is neither, he does not independently exist. The proof that the self is not really different from the aggregates is the first of the reasonings Candrakiirti employs, and the proof that it is not really the same as the aggregates is the second. Although he includes five other sets of reasonings for the sake of refuting the existence of a self which is related to the aggregates as being present in them, as being something in which they are present, as possessing them, as being a composite of them, or as being their shape or configuration, the existence of a self which enters into any of these relations is also refuted by this basic argument, since, if the self enters into one of these relations, it must be related to the aggregates as different from them or as the same as them, regardless of what further specification of the relation between the two is given.

If the self and the aggregates were really different, the one could be conceived without relying on the other, and if they were really the same, they would be conceived to have all the same attributes. But since the self and the mind-body aggregates cannot be conceived in either of these ways, the self cannot be a real entity; and since the self cannot be a real entity (that is, a Self), Candrakiirti says, in verse 163, that it does not really possess attributes or stand in real relations to other things. It is ultimately for this reason, of course, that self is not found in analysis to stand in any of the five relations to the aggregates in which it is commonly thought to stand.

In verses 121-125 Candrakiirti basically argues that if the self exists apart from the aggregates, as taught by the Saa^mkhyas, Vai`se.sikas, and others, it could be identified and described without reference to the aggregates, but of course it cannot. He also claims that since the existence of the self they espouse is not imputed on the basis of the mind-body aggregates, it does not even conventionally exist. The self taught by the proponents of these systems, from the point of view of the Buddhist analysis of phenomena, must be an unchanging phenomenon, since all changing phenomena are included within the classification of phenomena as the mind-body aggregates. If it is an unchanging phenomenon. However, either it does not exist at all, like a barren woman's child, or it is an unchanging phenomenon like space or the cessation of suffering. However, it cannot be an existent unchanging phenomenon, since it could not then undergo suffering in the three worlds, perceive and enjoy objects, and so forth, things which a self by definition can do.

The existence of a self of this sort has to be refuted, according to Candrakiirti. Because some have been taught the belief that it is the self; but it is not the Self whose existence we need to refute in order to destroy our afflictions, for countless beings who have never believed that the self exists apart from the mind-body aggregates are nevertheless afflicted by reason of the belief in Self.

Since it is clear that there is no self which exists apart from the aggregates, some Buddhists, among whom Candrakiirti identifies at least the Sammatiiyas, have concluded that one or all of the mind-body aggregates must be the self. These Buddhists, whom I shall call the Buddhist realists, believe that the person, who is the object of the belief in Self, is actually the same as the aggregate or aggregates on the basis of which the idea of self arises, and that the Selflessness of the person is his lack of existence apart from this aggregate or these aggregates.

In verses 121-141, Candrakiirti discusses this view and its variants in order to help establish the ultimate reality of the self, to refute the realistic theory of self espoused by these Buddhists, and to show that their view of Selflessness is not the view we need to realize if we are to achieve liberation. Since the Buddhist realists support their views by reference to scriptures, Candrakiirti will attempt to refute them not only on the basis of the absurd consequences for their own realistic systems of thought, but also on the basis of the Buddha's statements in scripture. According to these Buddhists, Verse 126, because no self can be shown to exist apart from the aggregates the self conceived is the mind-body aggregates themselves.

However, some hold that the basis of the belief in Self is all five aggregates and others hold that its basis is consciousness alone.

In the first part of verse 127, Candrakiirti argues that if the mind-body aggregates or consciousness alone were the self, the self would be many things rather than the one thing it is, since there are five mind-body aggregates and the aggregate of consciousness itself is comprised of six distinct types of consciousness. That the self must be one thing numerically seems to be taken to be true not only on the basis of the conventional conception of self, but also because we experience ourselves as one entity rather than as many. This consequence, therefore, applies not only to the Buddhist realists, but to all of us who identify ourselves with our bodies and minds and conceive them to possess real existence. In the same verse Candrakiirti points out that if the aggregates or consciousness were the same as the self, belief in a self that is substantially existent (17) could not be, as these Buddhists believe, an error, since they say that the aggregates substantially exist and if the self really is the same as them, it too must substantially exist.

In verse 128, Candrakiirti presents four more absurd consequences of their view, each of which is to lead them, on the basis of their own system of thought, to an inferential cognition of the nonexistence of a person who is the same as one or more of the aggregates. On their view, he claims, it follows that the self would actually perish when it achieves liberation, since they believe that the aggregates cease to exist at that time; that the self would be a really different self from moment to moment, since they believe that the aggregates, which lose and then renew their existence at every moment, are really different from moment to moment; that the self's actions could not really produce results, since the aggregates cannot do so by reason of their real momentary character; and that the effects of the actions performed by the self would be experienced by a really different self, since they believe that the aggregates are really different aggregates from moment to moment.

On Candrakiirti's own view, the self is impermanent, but its permanence is simply a convention, while for these realists, the aggregates, and hence, the self, are impermanent by their own natures. An impermanent self which does not really exist does not suffer these same absurd consequences, since it is not really different from moment to moment.

Should it be replied to the last three of the objections stated in verse 128 that, although the aggregates are really different from moment to moment, as a whole they constitute a continuum which really exists, in verse 129, Candrakiirti alludes to an earlier refutation of their real existence as a continuum. The refutation is that since a real continuum requires a real relation to exist between its serial members, but no such relations, on their own view, can exist between one set of aggregates and another, there can be no real continuum of the aggregates. He concludes, therefore, that the view that the self is one or more of the aggregates is mistaken.

In verses 130-131, he shows the consequences of their view of self for their view of Selflessness. In verse 130, he argues that if the person is the same as the aggregates or consciousness, then since these Buddhists believe that the meditator perceives the Selflessness of the person, they must hold that he perceives the nonexistence of the aggregates or consciousness, even though they hold that the aggregates and consciousness really exist. In verse 131 he adds the criticism that if they answer that it is the nonexistence of an eternal governing spirit which is perceived. Then they cannot claim that it is the ultimate reality of the self they perceive, since the nonexistence of an eternal spirit is not, on their own view, the ultimate reality of the aggregates. It follows, moreover, that since they will not perceive the ultimate reality of the self, they will not eliminate the mental afflictions by using this meditation.

Candrakiirti next discusses the scriptural evidence for the realistic view against which he argues: Verse 132, If one claims that the aggregates are the self because the master claimed that they are the self, did he not say this to deny a self which exists apart from them? For in other scriptures he denied that the aggregates are the self.

Verse 133 Because, in brief, he claimed in other scriptures that neither form, nor feeling, nor discrimination, nor motivational forces, nor consciousness is the self, he cannot have held that the aggregates are the self.

When the Buddha said that the aggregates are the self, according to Candrakiirti, he was not explaining how to meditate on the ultimate reality

of the self, but how to refute non-Buddhist views of the self. In this context, to avoid confusing the non-Buddhists, who are not prepared to understand that the self does not really exist, he equated the self with the aggregates. But when the Buddha denied that the five aggregates are the self, he was speaking in the context of establishing the ultimate reality of the self.

At this point Candrakiirti has set out reasoning sufficient to generate in the minds of those who are intelligent an understanding of the ultimate reality of a person. However, those who find it difficult to comprehend a self that does not really exist may grasp at the independent existence of the self, as identified somehow with the aggregates, by qualifying its identity with them in various ways.

In verses 134-141, therefore, Candrakiirti refutes variants of the view that the self is the same as the aggregates. The reasonings he uses, moreover, help us to refine our understanding of the actual object of the belief in Self.

In verse 134, Candrakiirti says that when the Buddha identified the aggregates with the self (for the purpose stated above) he was not stating that the self is the essence of the aggregates, but that the composite of the aggregates is the self. He could not have meant that this is the self, therefore, since a composite of the aggregates is not just one thing which can perform the functions of a self. Since some Buddhists, apparently, held the view that the self is all of the aggregates together as a whole of this sort which is not different from its parts, Candrakiirti here argues that the self cannot be such a composite. The basis upon which he refutes this possibility is fundamentally the same as that used to refute the identification of the self with the aggregates: many things cannot be one thing.

In the first part of verse 135, he adds the criticism that if the mere composite of the aggregates could be the self, the composite of the parts of a chariot placed in a pile could then be a chariot, which is absurd. In the second part of the verse he makes a different, even more fundamental, point:

Verse 135 c, d, the scriptures say that the self is dependent on the aggregates. Therefore, the mere composite of the aggregates is not the self.

The full argument is that since the composite of the aggregates is the basis in dependence upon which the belief in Self arises, the object of the belief in Self, that is, the person himself, cannot be the composite. In his commentary, on this verse Candrakiirti explains what he means with an analogy. The collection of atoms which make up a color. He says, may be the basis upon which the belief in that color arises, but it is not the object of that belief. The actual object of the belief is the color itself, a sensible appearance which "covers" the collection of atoms as a result of the perceptual process. Similarly, the projected self is not the composite of aggregates "covered" by this projection as a result of the conceptual process, but the "covering" itself, a mental image which exists in dependence on the perception of the aggregates. This confusion between the basis upon which the belief in self arises and the actual object of the belief, it seems, lies at the heart of the confusion of the self with the aggregates, and calling attention to the dependent relation between the self and the aggregates can help the reader to refine his understanding of the self whose apparent independent existence is to be refuted. It is at this point, moreover, that Candrakiirti first introduces the notion of the conventionally existent self which dependently exists, and hence begins to make it clear that this type of self is not being denied.

The Buddhist realists, of course, have a reason for identifying the self with one or more of the aggregates. They believe that since the self does not exist apart from the aggregates, it must be the aggregates somehow, either the composite of all of its parts or one of the parts or perhaps the configuration of the composite of the parts. Otherwise, they claim, the self does not exist at all. According to Candrakiirti, these Buddhists have failed to understand that the nature of a merely conventionally existent self is to be neither different from nor the same as the aggregates. Since it is not a phenomenon by itself, but only in relation to the mind which projects it and the aggregates upon which it is projected.

In verse 136, Candrakiirti discusses a second attempt to save the view that the self is the aggregates, In response to the rejection of a self which is the composite of the aggregates, it may be claimed that the composite is the self insofar as it assumes a certain configuration or shape, just as the composite of the parts of a chariot is a chariot insofar as they are assembled into a certain shape. There is no self of this sort, Candrakiirti argues, because only the aggregate of form or body has shape or configuration. Hence, if this view is correct, form or body rather than the mental aggregates would then be the self, but this is absurd. Although we may often confuse a person with his body, a person, from the conventional point of view, is not thought to be his body alone, In verses 153-157, Candrakiirti also argues that not even a chariot is the same as the configuration of its parts, which in fact is merely the basis upon which the idea of a chariot arises.

In verse 137, Candrakiirti concludes that all attempts to identify the self with the aggregates, either by themselves or as a composite or as the shape of the composite, conflict with the Buddhist doctrine that the self attaches itself to the aggregates, for the self must then be an agent acting on its patient, the aggregates and an agent and its patient cannot be the same. If these Buddhists should reply, on doctrinal grounds, that they can be the same because there are no real agents, and only a real patient exists in this case, Candrakiirti points nut that patients cannot he conceived to exist apart from agents. Here he relies on the Maadhyamika view of the nature of conventionally existent things, according to which they do not exist just by themselves, but only as imputed in dependence on their bases of imputation, which are themselves merely conventionally existent. In this case, the existence of a patient is imputed in dependence on the existence of an agent being imputed, and if there is no agent, there can be no patient.

Candrakiirti summarizes his argument against the Buddhist realists as follows:

Verse 138, since the lord posited a self which exists in dependence on the six elements, earth, water, fire, air, mind, and space, and the six bases of contact, the eye organ, etc.,

Verse 139, and said that its existence depends on our having perceived consciousness and mental states, the self is not the same as these things nor is it a composite of them. So they are not the object of the belief in Self.

Here he makes explicit his basic criticism of the Buddhist realists, that they have confused the bases upon which thought imputes a self with the imputed self, the object of the belief in Self.

Candrakiirti then concludes his examination of Buddhist realism in verses 140-141, where he shows the confusion to which it leads about what is to be refuted in meditation on the Selflessness of the person. In verse 140, he expresses amazement at those who are thus driven to hold the view that they abandon the belief in Self by refuting the existence of a permanent self, which exists apart from the aggregates. In verse 141, he likens their situation to seeing a snake (that is, the self which is the impermanent aggregates), experiencing fear (that is, having the belief in Self), and then trying to calm one's fear (that is, to destroy the belief in Self) by arguing that the snake is not an elephant (that is the impermanent self is not a permanent self). If their view is correct, to destroy the belief in Self they would need to prove that the aggregates do not exist, but instead they argue that a Permanent self, which is not the basis upon which the "belief in Self'' arises, does not exist. Moreover, they themselves believe that the aggregates really exist.

Having established that the self is neither really different from the aggregates nor really the same as them, either straightforwardly or in any of the above modes. In verses 142-143, Candrakiirti considers three common ways in which the self is conceived to be related to the aggregates. It has been thought that the self is present in the aggregates, that it is that in which the aggregates are present, and that it is the possessor of the aggregates. It cannot be present in the aggregates or be that in which they are present, he argues, for the same reason it cannot really be different from them. The "present in" relation, which is conceived here to be the relation which obtains between one or more things and a receptacle containing it or them, requires the independent existence of its relata but it has already been shown that the self does not exist apart from the aggregates. The person cannot possess his mind-body aggregates, he continues, since the possessor is conceived to be either really different from his possessions, like a man and his cattle, or really the same, like a person and his body, but since it has already been proved that the self and the aggregates are neither really different from nor really the same as one another, the self cannot really possess his aggregates.

Candrakiirti has now shown that the self perceived by the obscured conventional mind is neither different from nor the same as the aggregates and is not related to the aggregates in any of the ways commonly conceived. He leaves it to the intelligent reader to realize that since what independently exists must be different from or the same as the aggregates, and the self has been shown to be neither different from nor the same as the aggregates, it cannot exist by itself.

The self, nevertheless, innately appears to the obscured conventional mind as separately existent, that is, as existing by itself or by its own nature, but not necessarily as something really different from the aggregates, since there is no innate conception of a self which exists apart from the aggregates. Since the belief that the self as an entity which exists apart from the aggregates is based on the acceptance of a doctrine, the refutation of a self which exists apart from the aggregates, according to Candrakiirti, is not sufficient to produce the inferenlial cognition needed to help destroy our innate belief in the separate existence of the self. To destroy our belief in such a self, the Self, we need to refute not only the view that the self exists apart from the aggregates, but also the view that the self is the same as them.

There is one Buddhist school of thought, the Vaatsiiputriiya, which had taught that the self is neither different from nor the same as the aggregates, but failed to draw the correct inference from that realization. After summarizing in verse 144 the positions already rejected from the point of view of scripture and stating in verse 145 that by refuting them we can destroy the belief in Self, Candrakiirti states the view of this school.

Verse 146: Some claim that the person is substantially existent, but inexplicable in regard to sameness, difference, impermanence, etc. This self, they say, is perceived by the six consciousnesses, and they believe that it is the object of the belief in Self.

Although these Buddhists believe, as the Praasa^ngikas do, that the person is neither different from nor the same as the aggregates and is the actual object of the belief in Self, they do not realize that this state of affairs implies that the person does not really exist. Instead, they think that he must substantially exist because he performs actions, experiences their results, and so forth, and is the object, as well as the basis of the idea of Self. In verse 147, Candrakiirti replies that what substantially exists cannot be explicable, since even on their own view one substantially existent thing (for example, consciousness) must be either different from or the same as another (for example, form), while in verse 148, he adds that a self which is inexplicable in this way can exist only conventionally or nominally. In verse 149, he argues that since these Buddhists also hold that a functional entity (18) (for example, consciousness) is not different from its own essence, but is different from another functional entity (for example, form), the self they espouse would not even be a functional entity, even though they claim it performs actions, and so forth.

Finally, after Candrakiirti reaffirms in verse 150 that the self is not substantially existent and as such does not stand in any of the aforesaid relationships to the mind-body aggregates, he says, nevertheless, that Verse 150 d, this self arises in dependence on the mind-body aggregates

Dependent existence of this sort, Candrakiirti believes, is the final meaning of the Buddha's famous doctrine of dependent arising,(19) for what arises in dependence on something else does not exist by its own nature, but only in relation to other things. Since conventional realities only dependently exist, they do not independently exist; their ultimate reality is their lack of separate existence, but they have this reality just because they exist dependently. Those who claim, therefore, that the Maadhyamika denial of the Self undercuts itself have failed to penetrate the subtlety with which Candrakiirti has provided a mode of existence for the self without attributing real or independent existence to it.


1. In Sanskrit, it is commonly known as the Madhyamakaavataara. Neither this work nor its autocommentary, the Madhyamakaavataarabhaa.sya, has survived as a whole in the Sanskrit original, but there exist Tibetan translations of each (dbU ma la `jug pa: P5262 and 5261, vol. 98 [Toh. 3861], and dbU ma la `jug pa'i bshad pa: P5263, vol. 98 [Toh. 3862]). The sixth chapter of the commentary, parts of which I shall discuss, has been translated into French by Louis de la Vallee Poussin in Le Museon (1907), pp. 249-317 and (1910) . pp. 271-358. However, I have relied primarily on the Tibetan texts and on an unpublished English translation made by Artemus Engle in 1980. The translations presented here are my own. Because scholars generally are more familiar with technical Buddhist Sanskrit terminology, than with their Tibetan translations, in what follows I shall list only the Sanskrit equivalents for my English translations of crucial terms.

2. Candrakiirti often uses the terms "aatman"("self") and "pudgala" "person") interchangeably, but he also uses "aatman" to refer to the self to be denied.

3. Paramaarthasatya.

4. Dharma.

5. Paramaarthasiddhi, satyasiddhi or tattvasiddhi, svabhaavasiddhi.

6. Madhyama.

7. Sa.mv.rtisiddhi, praj~naptisiddhi.

8. Prasa.nga.

9. Svalak.sa.nasiddha.

10. Svatantra.

11. `Suunyataa, ni.hsvabhaavataa.

12. Skandhas.

13. Sa.mv.rtisatya.

14.‘Samatha, the perfected state of samaadhi or concentration.

15. Satkaayad.r.s.ti. Literally this means "the false view which arises in dependence on the perishable collection of mind-body aggregates," but

for our purposes it will be clearer to translate this expression as "the belief in Self." The same translation shall be given to aha.mkaara.

16. Pudgalanairaatmya.

17. Dravyasat.

18. Bhava.

19. Pratiityasamutpaada.

Transcribed for Buddhism Today by Bhikkhuni Lien Hoa


Updated: 1-12-2000

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