- Distinction of the Buddha's Teachings
- from Brahmanism and Sramanism
- Bhikkhu Thich Nhat-Tu
The major philosophical traditions before the rise of Buddhism can be classified into
two major traditions, Brahmanism and 'Srama.nism. They again can be categorised into the
following schools of thought: Brahmanism, Materialism, Aajiivikism, Atomism, Jainism and
Scepticism. The last five which are grouped under the Sramanic tradition are opposed to
that of the first. Brahmanism, the orthodox (aastika) school of thought, based its
metaphysical theories on the Vedas as the final authority in all matters.
Materialism, Aajiivikism, Atomism, Jainism and Scepticism, the heterodoxy schools of
thought (nastikas), opposed to the orthodox Brahmanical system and its Vedas.
In searching for, as well as, establishing a new socially human moralism, the Buddha had
renounced all these metaphysical doctrines prevailed before and at his time. The
Brahmanical doctrines of the self (aatman) and ultimate reality (brahman),
the hedonistic materialism of the Cavarka, the Aajiivika theory of inherent nature (svabhaava),
the Jaina theory of action (kiriyavaada) and absolute scepticism of Sa~njaya are
rejected by the Buddha on the ground that they do not conduce to moralism and final
II. Distinction of Buddhism from Brahmanism
1. Buddhism, as a new philosophical way of life, emerges as a counter-movement against
ethical and metaphysical doctrines of Brahmanism. Buddhism being a naastika
completely rejects the authority of the Vedas and disproving the Brahmaa as the
lord of all creatures. This epistemologically entails denouncing the practice of sacrifice
as nonsensical and immoral in terms of ethics. According to the Buddha, the Brahmanical
claim that the Vedas, created by Brahmaa for protection of the moral law, are Sruti,
 divine revelations and the final authority each in every thing is
untenable. The Buddha has indirectly rejected this claim arguing that if no teachers of
the Vedic tradition have had vision of Brahmaa, the so-called creator of the Vedas
and this universe, the talk of Brahmaa is a blind talk, just as when a string of blind men
clinging to one another, neither can the foremost see, nor can the middle see, nor can the
hindmost see. In the Caanki Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaaya  the Buddha
again refutes the authority of the Vedas, the ancient scriptural statements (poraa.nam
mantapadam) as true while others are false, saying that because no braahma.nas
so far have attained personally direct knowledge of the truth of their statement, such a
claim on authority of the Vedas as truth is just a groundless faith with no
substance whatsoever (ghoso yeva kho eso lokasmii), or a blind tradition (andhave.nu).
The Buddha goes further rejecting the claim declaring that this falsity is not merely
based on faith (payiruupaasanti) but also based on the other four grounds, viz.,
inclination, report, consideration of reasons and reflection on and approval of an
2. The Buddha also rejects the cosmological theories of Braahmanism. If Brahmaa in the Vedas
is considered as the omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, infinite and ultimate reality, or
being regarded as a mere appearance, a name-and-form, which is one, non-dual,
undifferentiated, non-temporal, non-spatial, non-causal, beginningless, endless,
ungrounded, essenceless, transcendental, invisible, imperceptible, indefinable,
incomprehensive and unknowable he is substituted with the law of dependent origination
(Pa.ticcasamuppaada // pratiitayasamupaada) by the Buddha. In its general
formula "so this being, that becomes; from the arising of this that arises; this not
being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases," this law
explains that all phenomena and everything in this world are both conditioned (paticcasamuppanna//
pratiityasamutpanna) and conditioning (pa.ticcasamuppaada // pratityasamutpaada);
they are, therefore, relative and interdependent without the first uncaused causer, i.e.
Brahmaa. Being endowed with mutually arising characteristics, this doctrine opposes
theories of past determinism  (pubbekatahetu), of theistic determinism (issara-nimmaana
hetu) and of non-causation and non-condition (ahetu-apaccaya-vaada). From
this doctrine the characteristics of existence can be understood as the causally natural
law: "Whether there be or not an appearance of a Tathaagata, this causal law of
nature, this orderly fixing of things prevails, namely, all phenomena are
impermanent, misery and unsubstantial. The principle of dependent origination (paticcasamuppaada)
is called the middle doctrine (majjhena dha"mma"m deseti)
because it avoids the extremely biased theories, as mentioned above.
3. The Brahmanical theory of self (aatman) as the central theme expounded in
the Upani.sads is also refuted. The so-called aatman is in fact only the
physico-psychological combination of the five aggregates or groups (pa~ncakkhandha),
viz., the body-group (ruupakkhandha), the feeling-group (vedanaakkhandha),
the perception-group (sa~n~naakkhandha), the activities-group (samkhaakkhandha),
and the consciousness-group (vi~n~naanakkhandha). These five aggregates (pa~ncakkhandha)
are all compounded and all conditioned. Being so, they are all impermanent and all
constantly changing. That is to say, they are of dependently arising and passing away, so
that there is nothing in the nature of a stable, persisting and eternal entity to be found
in them. "Whatever is impermanent is suffering, is no-self." This fact of
fivefold combination of a personality is "true, not false an unalterable."
The Buddha emphasized that the aatman is like a mountain stream, which flows fast
and is forever changing. There is no being (sat), there is only becoming (bhava)
in it. The arising (uppaada), disappearance (vyaya) and changing of what
exists (a~n~natatha) are the three signs of compounded things. The belief in a
permanent soul (aatman) not only negates the activities of moral life but also
falls in a form of grasping, a hindrance to spiritual liberation.
4. The fourfold caste society of Brahmanism, mistakenly based on the concept of Brahmaa
as the creator of the universe, is completely denounced by the Buddha. According to the
Buddha any claim of superiority of Braahman-class over the other classes is untenably
social bias for getting economic privilege and gain. Such an inequality of Brahmanism is
strongly attacked by the Buddha on the following grounds. Biologically, man is of one
species  and therefore any claim on the divine origin is refuted. Ethically, all
human beings are equal by birth, sex and race. Only their moral conduct, which is directed
by the intention or choice (cetanaa), makes them noble or ignoble, exacted or low.
According to this moral principle, mans activities and tendencies make him a farmer
(who cultivates the land), a craftsman (who produces utensils and instruments), a servant
(who serves others for a living), a thief (who takes to stealing), a soldier (who serves
in the army), a teacher (who learns and imparts knowledge to others), a king (who rules a
country), a minister (who helps the king in governing the country). In short, one is a
ruler (khattiya), a priest(braahma.na), a businessman (vessa)
or a servant (sudda) is due to ones moral behaviour and actual
activities. By birth one is not a braahma.na or an out-caste (vasala). It is
his activities that make him so. The Brahmans claim for being superior in
society is criticised by the Buddha, who proves that all braahma.nas are in fact
womb-born of bramin women in the natural way, not of the mouth of the Brahmaa, the
5. The soteriological theory of Brahmanism, as presented in the Vedas and the
Upani.sad, through purificatory bathing, sacrifices as well as practice of severe
asceticism  is rejected by the Buddha. The Buddha clearly teaches that neither
purificatory bathing nor self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga)  can bring
about heavenly existence (sagga), purity (suddhi) or emancipation (vimutti).
Bathing oneself in the water of the so-called sacred rivers as believed of capable of
washing away sins and moral evils in the Vedas is regarded as foolish act in
Buddhism. The classic example of the Buddhist argument against this is that if the water
had such divinely purificatory powers, the aquatic shatters such as fishes, frogs,
tortoises, crocodiles, water-snakes etc., would have become saint or would have reborn in
the heaven, for their constant being in such waters. Disproving the possibility of
washing away sins from bathing in the holy waters, the Buddha reads a new meaning into the
existing rite introducing of bathing without waters, such as bathing in the Noble
Eightfold path. Such bathing is capable of conducting to liberation.
6. Ritualism, ceremonialism and sacrifices (ya~n~na//yaj~na)  are the most
prominent features of Brahmanism as reflected in the .Rgveda and the Brahma.nas.
These are most important part of Brahmanical religion. They govern condition of human as
well as animals. "Thing animate or inanimate are all under the magical spell of
ceremony. Gods, men, living beings, lifeless things can all be equally moved through the
power of prayer or sacrifice." Their existence was for the sake of the ceremony.
The practice of human sacrifice was also found in the Brahma.nas. A Brahma.na named
'Sunah'sepa about to be sacrificed in lieu of the son of a king was saved. In the another
passage of the Braahma.nas I. 8, this kind of immoral practice is mentioned
in detail. The gods killed a man for their victim. But form him thus killed the part,
which was fit for a sacrifice went out and entered a horse. Thence the horse became an
animal for being sacrificed. The gods the killed the horse, but for the part fir for being
sacrificed went out of it and entered an ox. The gods the killed the ox . . . sheep, goal
etc. The sacrificial part remained for the longest time in the goat, thence it became
pre-eminently fit for being sacrificed. Such bloody sacrifices were considered to be
necessary to propitiate gods. In the Pali texts  five kinds of bloody sacrifices
are frequently referred, viz., horse-sacrifice, human-sacrifice, peg-thrown site
sacrifice, drinking of victory or strength, and the bolts-withdrawn sacrifice or universal
sacrifice. In the Discourse of the Wrong Sacrifice and the Right (Kutadanta
Sutta) of the Diigha Nikaaya  these immoral Brahmanical sacrifices with its
three modes and its accessories of sixteen kinds  are strongly criticized by the
Buddha, who introduces new kinds of sacrifice, which is not bloodshed, less difficulty and
trouble, but bringing greater fruit and advantage in this life and hereafter. These
consist of (i) offering to moral sangha including individuals of high moral, (ii)
putting up of a dwelling place (vihaara) on behalf of the sangha in all the
four direction, (iii) taking refuge in the Buddha, his dhamma and his sangha;
(iv) observing the five moral principles, namely, abstinence from destroying life, from
taking what is not given, from sexual misconduct, from telling lies and from drinking
alcohol, (v) observing the minor morality, (vi) developing confidence, (vii) controlling
the five senses, (viii) cultivating mindfulness, (ix) Living in content and solitude, (x)
cutting off five hindrances and cultivating the four jhaanas. Thus, the amoral
ceremonialism and sacrificism of Brahamnism is contrastedly substituted with the socially
human moralism of Buddhism, such as love, sympathy, liberality and humanity etc.
7. The Pali texts refer a variety of asceticism, such as bovine ascetics (go-vatika)
undertaking cow-practice (go-vata) putting a horn on their head and tying a tail
and doing everything done by cows, and canine ascetics (kukkuravatika) undertaking
the dog-practice, by dogs. In denouncing these useless practices, the Buddha points
out their cause and the motive as ignorance and desired of attention and fame. So far
as its consequence is concerned, the Buddha pointed out that, these practices, despite of
torturing the ascetic, with no profitable state and realisation of vision and
knowledge, would lead them to rebirth in animal world (niraya). Asceticism
is not the means of escaping the saasaara. It is low, vulgar, base, ignoble and not
conductive to good (hiina, gaama, pothujjanika, anariya, anattasaahita). The Buddha
categorises two kinds of austerities: one torments the self (attantapa), torments
others (parantapa), and torments both self and others (attantapo ca parantapo ca),
and the other is one that does not torture the body, but self-discipline, the discipline
of the five senses, that is the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path, leading the
practitioner to his final liberation. Among the two, the Buddha recommends the latter and
considers it as the basis of the life of chastity and fundamental ascetic virtue in
III. Distinction of Buddhism from Sramanism
As stated earlier that being emerged in the history of Indian thought as a new doctrine
and practice, Buddhism is naturally different from and opposed to those of old as well as
contemporary systems, such as the six heretical traditions. So many references are found
in the Pali canon showing the Buddhas attitude, analysis and criticism of his six
contemporary heretical teachers and their doctrines. The model of reference to the six
heretical teachers in the Pali canon is frequently referred to as a group  for general
purpose, and causally with a particular heretic  for a specific purpose of critique,
though there is no evidence that the Buddha ever met with any of them face to face.
Sometimes, the names of these theory founders are mentioned in full and sometimes their
names are not given. It should be noted here that there is the case in which some
confusion is occurred in identifying the names of these heretics and their teachings.
There is a case, due to the complexity of their perspective theories, some theory referred
to them without mentioning their perspective names becomes difficult to identify. In
most the cases, the criticisms of the heretics appeared in the Tipi.taka are
frequently made by the Buddha, sometimes by his disciples.
In his historical visit to the Buddha, King Ajaatasattu says that he has previously
paid visits to the six heretical teachers, whose doctrines are logically dissatisfied and
ethically puzzled as recounted by him in the Saama~n~naphala Sutta  of the Diigha
Nikaaya. These doctrines can be briefly summed up as follows: (i) Puura.na Kassapa
propounded the doctrine of amoralist causation or inefficacy of action (akiriyavaada)
denying the intentional actions capable of bearing fruits. That is to say, for him, there
is no merit of doing good and no demerit of doing evil, and as a consequences this
contention leads to the rejection of the validity of moral distinctions and
responsibility; (ii) Makkhali Gosaala denying the causes of things (ahetuvaada)
and maintaining human intention and effort as powerless, advocated determinism or fatalism
(niyati) of six classes of beings saying that self-purification or final
emancipation could only be achievable through a fatally fixed course in transmigration (sa"msaara);
(iii) Ajita Kesakambalin uphold the materialistic annihilationism (ucchedavaada/di.t.thi),
which identifies the psycho-physical person (naama-ruupa) with the body (ruupa),
rejecting human effort and the world hereafter (para loka). When the body is dead,
it entails the total annihilation of the psycho-physical person, without the continuity of
the consciousness for bearing moral retribution of his deeds done; (iv) Pakudha Kaccaayana
believed in atomism of the seven eternal uncreated and noncreative substances denying
psycho-ethical phenomena among with the concept of psycho-physical person. This thus
entails the rejection of moral behaviour of human beings by saying that there is no crime
in killing a person; (v) Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta advocates the theory of past determination
(pubbekatahetu) maintaining that freedom from bonds is possible through practice of
severe austerity or self-torture and observing fourfold restraint (caatuyaamasa"mvara)
in four directions; (vi) Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta, an ignorant skeptic, refuted to answer,
positively or negatively or both or neither, any doctrine or statement, including moral
distinctions and responsibility of human beings, put to him in question. In this
connection, Bhikkhu Bodhi has rightly pointed out: "In the Brahmajaala Sutta,
his position is included among the "endless equivocators" or
"eel-wrigglers" who are incapable of taking a definite stance on the vital
philosophical questions of the day." The ethical theories of six heretical
teachers can be grouped under four main categories, namely, materialism (Caaraaka),
naturalism (Aajiivikism), Jainism and scepticism.
1. The Materialists are known by different names: the Caarvaakas, the Lokaayatikas or
the Baarhaspatyas. Ajita Kesakambali, Puura.na Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccaayana are
known as the Materialists of Ancient India. Believing in natural phenomena (svabhaava),
they advocate the ultimately eternal reality of matter reducing all phenomena to four
(according to Ajita Kesakambali), or seven constituents (according to Pakudha Kaccaayana)
namely, earth, water, fire, air, happiness, suffering and life principle (jiva).
Materialism does not believe in the continuity of human existence after death. This
logically follows the denying of moral retribution (kamma//karma), which leads to
moral nihilism (natthikavaada). The Buddha therefore, regards the materialists as
nihilistically amoralists (natthikavaadin).
2. Aajiivikism, like Materialism, is a school of Naturalists. The well-known founder of
this school is Makkhali Gosaala. They believe in the ultimate reality of matter, on one
hand, and admit the continuity of human existence after death, on the other. Thus, they
differ from Materialists from the charge of nihilism. The naturalist philosophy of
Aajiivikism is covered in three important concepts, viz., fate (niyati) species (sa"ngati)
and inherent nature (bhaava, svabhaava). Fate (niyati) is the principle
of coming into existence. Species (sa"ngati) determines species of a being as
a human or an animal. And inherent nature (bhaava, svabhaava) determines
characteristics and nature of that being. The major Buddhist rejection of Aajiivikism is
on the ground that the latter does not believe in human effort on the part of
individual. The Aajiivikisms rejection of human effort, thus, entails the denial
of the freedom of will. Following this, purification is impossible by ones own
transformation but through the fixed cycles of existence (saasaara-suddhi). Thus it
falls into the form of past-determination (pubbekatahetuvaada), a determined theory
against moralism through human effort in the present, and of the theory of external
causation (para kata"m).
3. Jainism as systematised by Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta, the Mahaaviira, is different from
Buddhism in terms of epistemology  and ethics. So far as ethics is concerned,
Mahaaviira seems ignore the emphasis on the importance of psychological motive (cetanaa)
of the moral action (karma/kiriya), as uniquely does the Buddha. For Mahaaviira,
bodily action performed with or without ones intention will produce equal
consequence. Mahaaviira appears to believe in partially biological determination and
partial human action, when he says "things are partially determined and partially
undetermined" (niyayaaniyayaa saataa). His ethical theory can be, thus,
grouped under past-determination (pubbekatahetuvaada), a deterministic theory
explaining every human experience is due to past action, which is condemned by the Buddha
as against human cultivation of ethics. Another ground on which the Buddha rejects
Mahaaviiras theory of moral action (kiriyavaada) is the latters
advocating non-doing and expiating ones past actions by extreme austerities or
self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga)  as a means to attain liberation,
which is painful, ignoble and unbeneficial.
4. Absolute scepticism was known to India philosophy very early. The founder of this
school is known as Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta. He is known as a theorist of endless
equivocation or an equivocationist (amraavikkhepavaadin). He is extremely
skeptical regarding any kinds of certainty or human knowledge. He escapes from both
negative and positive statements asserting no thesis of his own, even the thesis of what
is good (kusala) and evil (akusala). According to the Buddha, his scepticism
is derived from both the fear of falling into error and the ignorance of giving answer to
any question put to him for discussion. This extreme scepticism or sceptical doubt (vicikicchaa),
according to the Buddha, is a mental hindrance, fetter or defilement, which will lead to
non-development towards achievement of its intellectual and spiritual goal or to
non-productivity of mind (cetokhila).
The Buddhist scripture  shows its suspicion to the common claim of these heretical
teachers of being constantly "all-knowing, all-seeing and all-embracing
knowledge-and-vision." The Buddhist argument leveled against such a claim starts
with a basic question that if they were so achieved why they had loosen their way when
entering a new place and why they did not know how to escape from trouble while countering
a fierce animal like dog, elephant, horse or a bullock, etc. Moreover, if they were really
omniscient, they would have not asked people their name, clan, the name of a village, a
market town and the way etc. They in fact did ask such questions. This shows that their
knowledge is evidently limited just like that of a average or worldly man (puthujjana//p.rthagjana).
The Greater Discourse to Saccaka (Mahaasaccakasutta) mentions about
the imperfection of the six heretics. Here in this Sutta, Saccaka, the son of
Jains, disproved their perfection revealing that they shelved the question by asking
another, answered off the point and evinced anger and ill-will and discontent when taken
in hand speech by speech by him. He admires the Buddha because he found him the contrary:
"But while the Gotama [the Buddha] was being spoken to thus so mockingly and was
being assailed by accusing ways of speech, his colour was clear and countenance happy like
that of a perfected one, a fully Self-awakened one." This shows that the Buddha
is really of unique perfection, which is unparalleled by the six heretical teachers.
In the Sandaka Sutta  of the Majjhima Nikaaya, the doctrines
of the first four heretics are called amoralism (abrahmacariya), for they among
with the other two heretics maintaining more or less the theory of no moral causation (akiriyavaada).
Their doctrines are altogether rejected as wrong theories (micchaadi.t.thi), their
thought as wrong thought (micchaasa"nkappa) and their speech as wrong speech (micchaavaacaa).
According to the Buddha, the profounders of akiriyavaada are to reject three ways
of moral conducts (sucarita), namely, moral bodily conduct (kaaya-sucarita),
moral conduct in speech (vacii-sucarita) and moral conduct in mentality (mano-sucarita).
This rejecting of moral action and its consequences logically entails the attitude of
being engaged and enjoyed in threefold evil conduct (duccarita), which is the basis
of degeneration of human ethics. In other words, those who fail to see the principle of
moral causation (kiriyavaada) will surely maintain that there is no action (karma),
non-causation of things (ahetuvaada), no the world beyond (para loka). Such
theorizers as well as their followers would be blamed in this very life (idha loka)
and after passing away from this world they will go to a state of suffering (duggati).
As the case being the doctrines of the six heretics were criticized by the Buddhists as
lacking of the principle of righteousness (kusala-dhamma). These were rejected as
unworthy to be followed and therefore one should avoid to devotion and practice as soon as
Denouncing all Indian ethical theories preceding and contemporary with him, the Buddha
adopted and introduced a middle standpoint for his epistemology and ethics known as the
theory of dependent origination (Pa.ticcasamuppaada//pratiitayasamupaada). With
this new morally middle doctrine (majjhena dha"mma"m deseti), the Buddha
rejects all kinds of extremist theories, such as permanent existence and nihilistic
non-existence, strict determinism, past-determination, theistic determination as well as
non-causation-and-non-conditionality, as follows:
1. The extremes of existence and non-existence or being and non-being. The former is
the theory admitting that everything exists (sabbaa atthii ti), while the later
advocating that nothing actually exists (sabbaa natthii ti ).
2. The extremes of eternalism (sassatavaada) and annihilationalism (ucchedavaada).
If eternalism admits that one and the same person both performs actions and experiences
the results, then annihilation admits that one performs actions, another experiences the
3. The extremes of past-determination (sabbaa pubbekatahetuvaada) or theistic
determination (sabba issaranimmaanavaada) and non-causation-and-non-conditionality
(sabaa ahetu-apaccaya-vaada). The first advocate that all human experience,
suffering or happiness are determined either by actions performed from the previous lives,
or by an almighty God, whereas the last admitting all phenomena and human experience are
happened without causes and conditions.
4. The extremes of attakaaravaada, the belief that pleasure and pain
brought about by ones self, and parakaaravaada, the belief that pleasure
and pain brought about by another.
5. The extremes of Kaarakavedakaadi-ekattavaada and Kaarakavedakaadi-naanattavaada.
The former is the belief that the doer and the receiver of deed are the same, whereas the
latter is the belief that the doer and the receiver of deed are different. If
the Braahmanical teachings of the Vedas and Upani.sads represent a theistic
theory of ethics, the Sramanic thinkers like Puura.na Kassapa, Ajita Kesakambali, Pakudha
Kaccaayana, Makkhali Gosaala, Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta and Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta etc.,
represent some form of amoralism (e.g. nihilistic materialism, non-causationalism and
determinism), the Buddhas teachings (dhamma) are positive assertions of a
rational-psychological moralism, which is socially and universally acceptable.
Abbreviations and References
- 1. Texts
A. = A"nguttara-Nikaaya, I-V, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, C. A. F. Rhys Davids.
(London: PTS, 1885-1900)
- BU. = B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad
- ChU. = Chaandogya Upani.sad
- D. = Diighanikaaya, I-III, ed. T. W. Rhys David and J. E. Carpenter, (London:
- DA. = Diighanikaaya A.t.thakathaa, I-III, ed. T. W. Rhys David and J. E.
Carpenter, W. Stede. (London: PTS, 1886-1932)
- Dhp. = Dhammapada, ed. K. R. Norman and O. von Hinuber. (London: PTS, 1931)
- DhpA. = Dhammapada A.t.thakathaa, I-V, ed. H. Smith, H. C. Norman, L. S. Tailang.
(London: PTS, 1906-15)
- Dhs. = Dhammasa"nga.nii, ed. E. Muller. (London: PTS, 1885)
- EB. = Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, I-V, ed. G. P. Malalasekera. (Ceylon:
- It. = Itivuttaka, ed. E. Windisch. (London: PTS, 1890)
- Khp. = Khuddakapaa.tha, ed. Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS, 1931)
- KU. = Ka.tæ ha Upani.sad
- M. = Majjhimanikaaya, I-IV, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, Mrs. Rhys Davids.
(London: PTS, 1888-1902)
- MA. = Majjhimanikaaya A.t.thakathaa, I-V, ed. J. H. Woods, D. Kosambi, I. B.
Horner. (London: PTS, 1922-38)
- MaU. = Maa.n.dukya Upani.sad
- MuU. = Mu.n.daka Upani.sad
- PTS. = Pali Text Society
- .RV. = .Rgveda
- S. = Sa"myuttanikaaya, I-V, ed. L. Feer and Mrs. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS,
- Sn.= Suttanipaata, ed. D. Andersen and H. Smith. (London: PTS, 1913)
- 'SvetU. = 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad.
- Thig. = Theriigaathaa, ed. R. Pischel. (London: PTS, 1883)
- Ud. = Udaana, ed. P. Steinthal. (London: PTS, 1885)
- Vbh. = Vibha"nga, ed. and tr. by S. K. Mukhopadhyaya. (Santiniketan:
- Vin. = Vinayapi.taka, I-V, ed. H. Oldenberg. (London: PTS, 1879-83)
- Vism. = Visuddhdimagga, ed. H. C. Warren and D. Kosambi. HOS.41.
- Barua, Benimadhab. (1998) A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1st Ed. 1921.
- Bodhi, Bhikkhu (1989) The Discourse on Fruits of Recluseship, the S ma
aphala Sutta and Its Commentaries. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
- Kalupahana, David J. (1975) Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.
Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.
- Kalupahana, David J. (1994). A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and
Discontinuities. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1st Ed. 1992.
- Kalupahana, David J. (1994). A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and
Discontinuities. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1st Ed. 1992.
- Sinha, Jadunath. (1999). Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Pilgrims Book Pvt.
Ltd, 1st Ed. 1963.
-  KU. i. 3, 11-2; 1, 2, 12&24; MuU. ii. 1, 5-7; 2, 3-5; BU. ii,
4. 10. Cf. BU. iv. 4, 22; ChU. iii, 24, 2; viii. 1, 5; 7, 1; iii. 14, 2; KU.
i. 2, 13; ii. 3, 17; 2, 18; MuU. ii. 2, 7, 10-12; iii. 1, 5; 1, 6-9; 2,
-  Literally means "hearing" in Sanskrit. This is so-called because it was
not written down but transmitted orally from the teacher to his followers.
-  D. I. 238ff. Cf. M. II. 170; MLS. II. 360.
-  M. II. 164
-  M. II. 84.
-  M. II. 170; MLS. II. 360. These five grounds also recur at S. II.
115, IV. 138; KS. II. 82; IV. 88. Cf. A. I. 190, II. 191.
-  KU. i. 2. 21; ChU. vi. 1, 14.
-  ChU. vi. 2. 1; 'SvetU. iii, 9; BU. ii. 4, 14; iv, 4, 19; KU.
ii. 1, 11.
-  KU. i. 2, 14-20; ii. 1, 5, 12-3; MaU. i, 1, 7; MuU. iii. 1, 7; BU.
ii. 5, 9; iii, 8, 8; iv. 4, 15-6.
-  KU. i. 2, 14; 'SvetU. vi. 9.
-  KU. i. 2, 18.
-  This unique law of dependent origination or causal uprising (paticcasamuppaada)
was discovered by the Buddha on his attainment of perfect enlightenment. Ud.
-  S. II. 27f, 64f, 95; KS. II. 23, 45, 66: imasmii sati idaa hoti,
imassupaada idam uppajjati; imasmii asati idaa na hoti, imassa nirodhaa idaa nirujjhati. Vide
also M. III. 63; MLS. III. 107, and Ud. 2.
-  This view is examined at M. II. 214; MLS. III. 3ff.
-  Cf. A. I. 173ff; GS. I. 157ff.
-  Dhaatu-dhammatthitataa = sbhaava-tthitataa, that which, as cause,
establishes elements as effects. Quoted from GS. I. 264, note 3.
-  Dhamma-niyaamataa that which, as cause, invariably fixes things in our
minds, as effects. Cf. S. II. 25; KS. II. 21, where a further term is
added, idappaccayata, the relation of this to that. Quoted from GS.
I. 264. n. 4.
-  The meaning of sankhaara can differ according to contexts. In the context of
the five aggregates of existence (khandha), sankhaara tends to mean bad
thoughts that a person harbors, and so its sense is psychological; but in the context of
the three characteristics of existence (tilakkhana), sankhaara tends to mean
all phenomena or compounded things, be they physical or psychological; in other words the
whole of the five aggregates of existence.
-  Also see in Dhp.: Sabbe sankhaara aniccati (277); Sabbe sankhaara
dukkhaati (278); Sabbe dhamma anattaati (279).
-  MuU. ii. 2, 11; iii. 1, 1-2; 2, 1; KU. i. 2, 18; 3, 3-4, 9-10; ii. 2,
13; 'SvetU. i. 9-10, 12; iii. 19; ChU. iv. 15, 4; BU. iv. 4, 22; ii.
5, 15. For detailed treatment of the Upanisadic aatman, see for example Sinha
-  S. III, p. 50.
-  S. III. 67; KS. III 59f. Also see M. III. 329.
-  S. V. 430; KS. V. 365.
-  A. IV. 137; GS. IV. 92: Just as a mountain river, winding here and
there, swiftly flowing, taking all along with it, never for a moment or for an instant or
for a second pauses, but rushes of, swirls along and sweeps forward; even so, braahman,
like a mountain river is the life of man, insignificant, trifling, fraught with ill and
For the born there is no immortality.
-  A. I. 152; GS. I. 135: "Monks, there are these three
condition-marks of that which is conditioned. What three? Its genesis is apparent, its
passing away is apparent, its changeability while it persists is apparent. These are the
-  EB. III. 328b.
-  Sn. 600-611; M. II. 196ff.
-  M. II. 148ff; D. I. 80ff; III. 80ff.
-  Sn. p. 23. Reference is from EB. V. 116b.
-  D. III. 81-2; DB. III. 78-9.
-  Detailed account of these practices is repeatedly found at D. I. 165ff; III.
6-7, 37ff; A. I. 294; II. 207; M. I. 77ff., 238ff., 342, 387, 524.
-  M. I. 240ff: This is considered as another extreme of practice vs.
-  Thig. 240-1.
-  S. I. 38.
-  On Braama.nas sacrifices, see M. I. 343-44; S. I. 75; A. IV.
41; D. I. 127, 141.
-  Tachibana (1986): 39.
-  Tachibana (1986): 40-1.
-  For example at S. I. 76; A. II. 42; IV. 151; It. 21; Sn. 303
-  For meaning of these sacrifices, see KS. I. 102, n. 1.
-  D. I. 144ff; DB. I. 182ff.
-  For their content, see DB. I. 174, nn. 3-4.
-  In Buddhism there are also thirteen ascetic practices (dhuta"nga).
These are not considered by the Buddha as the path leading to liberation but rather an
alternative preparation to the path. For a full account see EB. II. 168. Cf. M. III.
39-42; DhpA. I. 141; Vism. ch. ii.).
-  M. I. 387ff; D. III. 6-7.
-  D. III. 44-5.
-  S. IV. 338.
-  M. I. 388.
-  D. III. 232.
-  S. I. 38.
-  See, for instance, at D. I. 56ff; M. I. 517ff; M. II. 2-4; S.
I. 69ff. Sometimes only two heretics are mentioned, for example, at A. IV. 47
only Puura.na and Niga,n.tha are dealt with for comparison.
-  See, for example, at S. III. 211; A. III. 383.
-  For instance, at M. I. 513-524; S. III. 207, 211.
-  For instance, at S. IV. 398: Ajata is confused with other heretics; at A.
I. 286: Ajata with Makkhali; at A. III. 383: Makkhali with Pakudha and
Puura.na. For further evidence to support this, see E. Thomas (1997): 130f., Bhikkhu Bodhi
(1989): 7 n.2; and KS. III. 17- n.2
-  E.g. M. I. 407, 515-17; S. III. 208, 210.
-  For example, at M. I. 515ff, Ananda is said to have analysed and then
refuted the teachings of the heretics, whose names are not mentioned.
-  D. I. 51-59.
-  Cp. Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 7.
-  Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 9.
-  On two kinds of Materialism, see Kalupahana (1975): 26-32; Kalupahana (1994):
-  D. I. 55.
-  D. I. 56.
-  D. I. 53.
-  M. I. 81-2.
-  A. I. 173.
-  Kalupahana (1975): 53.
-  For account on Mahaaviiras epistemology, see B. M. Barua (1998): 400-4;
Kalupahana (1994): 17-9.
-  SuutrakÙ taa"nga I. 1.2.4.
-  A. I. 173. For scrutiny of this point, see Kalupahana (1994): 19f.
-  M. II. 222.
-  S. V. 421.
-  D. I. 58.
-  EB. IV. s.v. doubt: 667a.
-  M. I. 519-20; MLS. II. 199. Cf. M. I. 92-3; A. I.
-  Their claims of this attainment can be found at many palaces in the Tripi.taka, see
for instance, at A. I. 220-1; A. IV. 428; M. I. 482, 519; M. II.
-  M. I. 519-20; MLS. II. 199.
-  M. I. 250-1; MLS. I. 305.
-  Including the Jaina leader Niga.n.t.tha Naathaputta.
-  Tr. by Horner, MLS. I. 305.
-  M. I. 513.
-  A. I. 33 says "When doctrine and discipline are wrongly expounded he
who strives energetically live a miserable lives." Tr. by F. L. Woodward, GS. I.
-  M. I. 519. Apart from the criticism levelled against the six heretics, this Sutta
also rejects the traditionalist and the rationalist. M. I. 520f.
-  S. II. 17; KS. II. 13. Also see in S. III. 134f; KS .
III. 114; and S. II. 76; KS. II. 52.
-  S. II. 20; KS. II. 16.
-  A. I. 173.
-  S. II. 22f; KS. II. 18f.
-  S. II. 75; KS. II. 52.